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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Accord and Satisfaction-Cashing Check Marked In Full
Payment-Conditional Request to Stop Payment
of Check
A dispute having arisen over coal transportation charges, the
debtor, on May 26th, sent a check marked in full payment as shown
in voucher. The voucher showed that the check covered the admitted
difference between the freight and the claim for damages, but there
was no further indication of the debtor's desire for an accord and
satisfaction. That the creditor so understood the desire was shown,
however, in his reply of the 27th, saying the check was acceptable
only on account and, if not agreeable, for the debtor to stop payment
on it. This letter reached the debtor on the 31st, the same day the
check was collected, having been deposited on the 28th. The debtor
did not stop payment and on June 3rd replied, reiterating the position
taken in his first letter. Held, there was no accord and satisfaction,
as the creditor did not voluntarily assent; and there was no compro-
mise, as no new consideration was given, since the debtor had paid
only the sum he admittedly owed and no part of the disputed
amount. 1
Did not the creditor voluntarily assent? There must be mutual
assent but this does not necessarily involve mental assent, since assent
will be implied from the circumstances and conduct inconsistent with
a refusal.2 It has been held that the acceptance of a check necessarily
involves an acceptance of the conditions upon which it was tendered,
even though at the time the creditor protests.&3 It is generally held
that the creditor has but one alternative and must accept the amount
I Moore and McCormack Co. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 37 F. (2d) 308
(C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
*Redmond v. Atlanta & B. Air Line Ry., 129 Ga. 133, 58 S. E. 874 (1907);
Woburn National Bank v. Woods, 77 N. H. 172, 89 At. 491 (1914).
' Northern Trust Co. v. Knowles, 208 Ill. App. 258 (1917) ; G. & L. Realty
Co. v. Friedman, 105 Misc. Rep. 632, 173 N. Y. Supp. 376 (1919); (1923) 9
VA. L. Rwc. (N. S.) 307; 3 WILL.ISTON, ON CONTRACTS, 1924, §1854; Note
(1925) 34 A. L. R. 1044. But cf. Goldmith v. Lichtenberg, 139 Mich. 163,
102 N. W. 627 (1905); Day v. McLea, L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 610, 60 L. T.
(N. S.) 947, 58 L. J. Q. (N. S.) 293, 37 Week. Rep. 483, 53 J. P. 532 (Eng.
1889). But cf. Hirachand Punamchand v. Temple, 1911 2 K. B. Div. 330.
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tendered upon the terms of the condition or return the check. 4 The
right to name the terms rests alone with the debtor.5
Can the creditor shift the onus of acting upon the debtor and take
the failure to stop payment as a confirmation? The offeree is at
liberty to accept wholly, or reject wholly, 'but one of these things he
must do; for if he answers proposing to accept under a modification,
this is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter offer which
necessitates an acceptance as did the original offer.0 Generally speak-
ing, if an offeror makes no reply to a counter offer, his silence and
inaction cannot be construed as assent, and this is true even in the
face of a statement that his silence would be taken as an acceptance. 7
A debtor must at least be given time to waive the conditions and, if
the creditor acts before the conditions are waived, it should be con-
sidered as an acceptance of the former terms.8 In the principal case
the creditor evidently understood the debtor's desire9 for an accord
and satisfaction and, despite this, he acted before receiving the
debtor's letter of Jfine 3rd which was certainly no waiver of the
conditions.
It is submitted that public policy will be 'better served by en-
couraging settlements and compromises out of court and that the
result attained here will discourage such attempts, since the creditor
"Seeds, Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N. E. 892, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 380 (1910) ; Ex parte Southern Cotton Oil Co., 207 Ala. 704,
93 Sou. 662, aff'd. 20 Ala. App. 1, 102 Sou. 149 (1922); 3 W.LISTON, ON
CONTRACTS (1924) §1856; Hoop v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 124 Kan. 769, 262
Pac. 544 (1928).5 Cunningham v. Standard Const. Co., 134 Ky. 198, 119 S. W. 765 (1909).
Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. C. 252, 19 S. E. 158 (1894).
'Felthouse v. Bindley, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 869, 31 L. J. C. P. 204, 6 L. T. 157,
10 W. R. 423, 142 Eng. Rep. 1037 (1862) ; Prescott v. Jones, 69 N. H. 305, 41
At. 352 (1898) ; 1 WiLLIsToN, ON CONTRACTS (1924) §§91-92. But cf. Had-
dow v. Owens Co., 172 Wis. 391, 179 N. W. 508 (1920); Burton Coal Co. v.
Gorman Coal Co., 22 Ohio App. 383, 153 N. E. 863 (1926) (In face of obvious
duty the debtor must act or otherwise the creditor's using the check will be no
accord and satisfaction). Discussed in (1927) 1 CiN. L. REV. 218.
'Policastro v. Pitske, 65 Misc. Rep. 524, 120 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1910).
(Creditor's using the check without waiver of the conditions by the debtor is
an accord and satisfaction and the debtor's mere silence in face of a counter
proposal was no waiver of his conditions); 4 PAGE, ON CONTACTS (1920)
§2504; Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 N. C. 432, 107 S. E. 451 (1921). When
there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties then it is otherwise; Egan
v. Crowther, 48 Cal. App. 362, 241 Pac. 900 (1925), discussed in (1925-26) 14
CA w. L. Rv. 250.
*In a few states the burden is on the debtor to make absolutely positive
that the creditor understands his intention for an accord and satisfaction.
Dimmick v. Banning, etc. Co., 256 Pa. 295, 100 At]. 871 (1917). But cf. Davis
Sulphur Ore Co. v. Powers, 130 N. C. 152, 41 S. E. 6 (1902) (Where, "which
balances account," is held to sufficiently show intent).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
can impose new duties on the debtor while having the advantage of
the debtor's check in his possession as a threat. In any event, the
reasoning of the present case seems open to criticism as it results in
permitting the creditor to shift the burden of acting upon the debtor
without giving a reasonable length of time in which to act. The same
result could more logically be attained on the ground of lack of con-
sideration, since no part of the disputed amount was paid but only
the sum admittedly due.10
HUGH B. CAMPBELL.
Agency-Bills and Notes-Agent's Indorsement of Check
Drawn to Principal's Order
An attorney, with authority to settle his client's claim, received a
check payable jointly to himself and the client. He indorsed for both,
cashed the check, and retained the proceeds. Held, the transaction
amounted to payment to the attorney of the amount of cash repre-
sented by the check and received thereon, and was payment of client's
claim.'
Although some courts show a tendency to hold that an attorney
with authority to settle a client's claim has implied authority to in-
dorse a check received in payment, 2 the rule generally laid down is
that authority to indorse negotiable paper will not be implied unless it
is absolutely necessary to the carrying out of the purpose of the
agency.8 By this rule, the check in the instant case was wrongfully
indorsed.
"Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204,
103 N. E. 695 (1913) (Refuses -to follow idea of no voluntary assent by
creditor but gets the same result on ground of no consideration) ; Hamburger
v. Economy Dept. Store, 222 N. W. 603 (S. D. 1928) ; (1929) 14 IowA L. Rv.
474. Contra: Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 20 Sup. Ct. 924, 44
L. ed. 1099 (1899) ; 1 WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS (1924) §129; Schnell v. Perl-
mon, 238 N. Y. 362, 144 N. E. 641, 34 A. L. R. 1023, aff'd 239 N. Y. 504,
147 N. E. 171 (1924). Discussed in (1924) 2 N. Y. L. REV. 414; Shapleigh
Hardware Co. v. Farmer's Federation Inc., 195 N. C. 702, 143 S. E. 471
(1928). See also, May Bros. v. Doggett, 124 Sou. 476 (Miss., 1929). If th6
disputed portion belongs to a separate and distinct transaction then it cannot
carry over so as to apply to the admitted indebtedness and create a dispute as
to it, Brent v. Whittington, 214 Ala. 613, 108 Sou. 567 (1926). But cf. Sylva
Supply Co. v. Watt, supra note 8. For general discussion see (1925) 9 MiNN.
L. REv. 458; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 71.
'Patterson v. Southern Ry. Co., 151 S. E. 818 (Ga. App. 1930).
'Nat. Bank of the Republic v. Old Town Bank, 112 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 7th,
1902) ; Brown v. Grimes, 74 Ind. App. 655, 129 N. E. 483 (1921) ; 1 THORNTON,,
ATTYs. AT LAW (1914) 363, 364.
'Bank of. Morganton v. Hay, 143 N. C. 326, 55 S. E. 811 (1906) ; Crahe v.
Mercantile etc. Bank, 295 Ill. 375, 129 N. E. 120 (1920) ; Note (1921) 12 A. L.
